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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent works on the labor management firm (LMF)have been con-
ducted to analyze a Japanese-style management. By considering the adjust-
ment cost for the investment, Iwai (1989) has rationalized the seniority pay-'
ing system in the LMF and verified it is the most efficient scheme for the
LMF. But his assumption that the old workers have no contribution to out-
put is counter factual. Turning our attention to a real world, we easily
recognize the old workers matter a great deal, i. e., the old cannot work
beside the production lines but their experiences can be devoted to other
supplemental sectors.
The main novelty is that we take into account the old generation's ef-
fort to catch up with the young generation. This effort effects the total pro-
duction in some manners, and is regarded as the alternative qualitative ad-
justment channel for the labor input. We can discuss that this "qualitative"
aspect is closely related to the seniority paying system. Much of emphasis in
what follows focuses on how to characterize this "qualitative" features.
In Section II , we introduce the basic framework that concentrates
on the way through which the old workers contribute to the whole produc-
tion. The main part, Section III , deals with the seniority paying system and-
some related topics are remarked in Section N. Concluding remarks
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follow. 
IT. MODEL AND SOLUTIONS 
Notations we will use are given as follows, 
Lj: labor input, i = I , 2 where I means young generation and 
2 means old one, 
nj: labor growth rate, L 1 : L z = I + n: 1 , for simplicity, 
we set Lz = I , 
K: capital input, where K 1 = K z = K, 
ki:capital-Iabor ratio. They can be written as 
kl =KlILl' kz =KzI I =Kl (I +n)IL l =kl (I +n) 
Yj=F(Kj, Lj), 
where Y 1 =L l/(k 1 ), Y z =L zl(k z) =j(k z) ; output, 
wj:wage rate, 
r: constant rental price for capital, 
1Jf (n) : adjustment cost for labor input, 
where 1Jf no 1Jf nn > 0 . 
The budget constraint can be expressed as follows, 
(I +n)wl +wz + 2 Kr+1Jf(n) = (1 +n)/(kd +O(n)j(k z) [1 ] 
o (n) is the induced incentive of the old workers when the youngers are en-
tried. This is observable for the LMF. 
Uzawa(I965) 's method to divide the human capital two sectors 
perfectly is not realistic because, in the ordinary Japanese firms, emplyees 
are required to be "all-round players" so the vague division would be 
dominated. In these circumstances, an interaction between sectors is signifi-
cant factor for an efficient management. Moreover, concentrating the fact 
that the work division corresponds roughly to the seniority, it is reason-
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able to focus our attention on the old-young workers' interactions, inter-
generational interaction. An basic idea is that new input embodies "new 
knowledge", which has been discussed by some authers(Romer(1986), 
Lucas (1988) ) . 
Subject to this constraint, the LMF determines k I, WI, W 2, n, so as 
to maximize the utility function defined over the received wage rate, 
U=U(WI, W2) [ 2 J 
Standard mathematical results characterize an interior solution by means of 
necessary conditions, that is, 
r=I'(kd 
au/aWl = I +n 
aU/aW 2 
= I(k I) - I ~ n I' (k I ) + ~~ I(k 2 ) 
m. IMPLICATIONS 
III - 1 The seniority paying system in the LMF 
[3J 
[4J 
[ 5 J 
[ 3 J and [ 4 J are well known conditions, but note that [ 4 J charc-
terizes the growth-oriented feature of the LMF (see I wai (1989) ). [5 J 
shows an optimal growth rate of labor, which is determined where a 
marginal cost (LHS) equals to a marginal benefit (RHS). [5 J yields 
K, a1Jf ao 
WI =/(k l ) ---I (k l ) --+- l(k 2 ) I +n an an [6J 
Hence, 
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[ 7 ] 
Then, 
[ 8 ] 
where we use aL1/an= 1 and a2L 1/an 2 = o. 
What appears in [ 8 ] states that the cost change when n is increas-
ed is devided to 1) a lowering of marginal productivity, 2) an increase of 
adjustment cost and 3) an induced incentive. It is worth to note that they 
all are the complementary adjustment channels for labor input. Neglecting 
Wand (), we go back to the classical world. Considering only W, Iwai(1989) 's 
conclusions are derived, that is, [8 ] is negative then the LMF constructs 
the wage profile based on ~he seniority rule. 
m - 2 effort function 
(a) The nature of () (n) 
If ()" has the negative sign then Iwai's conclusion is strengthened, 
however, the contrary case requires a little complicate consideration. When 
()" is positive but sufficiently small, i.e., ()" < dE > 0), then the LMF 
adopts the seniority paying system (E is a value of ()" when [ 5 ] = 0 . Here 
we focus only on the behavior of () in order to clarify its prominency). 
We cannot determine the sign of ()" without the solid micro-founda-
tions for () function. But to conjecture the behavior of our model, we will in-
fer the shape as follows. First, we assume 
()(O) = 1. [9 ] 
When the new labor input is equal to the old, the olders keep their effort con-
stant. This may occur when all worker is identical or substitutional. 
Second, 
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a(J(n) I > 0 
an n= 0 
[10J 
The first young worker will induce an extra effort of the olders. It is not 
unrealistic to assume that the marginal effort diminishes as n is increased, 
partly because the olders does not persevere forever and partly because the 
new knowledge becomes the common one as the newers become the majori-
ty. See Fig- I. If (J" < E, the seniority paying system is established. The 
plausible (J (n) is also depicted. 
(J 
no-seniority zone 




n++ n** n+ n* 
Fig- 1 
(b) Optimal labor growth rate 
n 
The role of () (n) is clarified by considering the labor growth rate. 
Because any points on () (n) satisfies the first order condition for n, so we can 
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not determine an unique optimal rate. This is because the effort function 
provides the qualitative adjustment channel for labor input. 
At 0 < n < n * *, because the higher wage corresponds to the higher 
effort, the seniority paying system implies a paying to one's effort or con-
tribution, not only on the seniority itself. Hence, the seniority paying system 
do consistent with the productivity and works as an incentive scheme. 
However, for n** <n where the old workers contract their effort, and for 
n* < n, the olders are degraded to the "in-active input", i.e., the human 
capital obsolescence arises. 
In order to maximize the older's effort level, in other words, to derive 
the highest incentive from the given W2, n must be set at n**, where 
a{}(n) I =0 
an n=n** . [l1J 
Lazear(1981) suggests that a seniority paying system discourages shirking. 
In his discussion the seniority system is itself an incentive scheme by 
"price (wage) ". In our model, to be consistent with an anti-shirking 
scheme, the LMF set the labor growth rate under n * *. In this sense, Our 
LMF can be equipped with the anti-shirking scheme by "quality", different-
ly from Lazear (I 981) . 
W. SOME REMARKS 
First, it is worth to note that the seniority paying system is not re-
jected even in stationary state when two generations' input are perfectly 
identical. In this case, the LMF faces the following problem and the first 
order conditions. 
Max u(w 1, W2) subject to L(w 1 +W2) + 2 rK= 2j(K, L) 
So whether w 1 < w 2 or WI> W 2 depends only on the preference structure of 
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the LMF, that is, when the indifference curve of u (w 1, W 2) tangents with 
the budget constraint at the upper area than the 45 degree line, the LMF 
would accept the seniority system. The seniority system does not depend an 
input decision. 
Second, when n* < n, the LMF cannot even produce the output if the 
LMF would be at stationry state, n = 0 so the rational LMF is never in this 
area. In this sense, the LMF sets an entry barrier against the outside 
workers at n * . 
Suppose now the LMF is at n** and the labor pool is extended to 
n+ by, for example, the immigration. Set aside the problem whether the 
foreigner has the new knowledge, O(n++) =O(n+) then the LMF will con-
tract the labor growth rate from n * to n + +. As the results, the entry barrier 
becomes more strictly. 
Third, we can infer why most Japanese firm adopts the seniority pay-
ing system. The seniority system is desirable when 
[12] 
If the production function is linear then YLL = O. If so, it is more 
easy to satisfy [1 2] . Put differently, when the input ratio is fixed, the seniori-
ty system is easily established. Whether the Japanese firms take on these 
characters or not must be questionable, however, here may be an important 
key concept to consider the seniority paying system in Japan. Suppose an ac-
cepting the foreign workers enlarges 1Jf" (it is a reasonable assumption) then 
WI, foreigner's wage, must be decreased because the seniority system 
becomes more intensive, i.e.,[ 8] become smaller. Moreover, 0" may also 
be increased because of the demolalization. If so, n + + and n * * are declined 
then the entry barrier will be more enhanced. 
If (J" or j(k 1) increase with llf" proportionally then no change will be 
arised. This means the olders work more than before to accept the 
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foreigners and not to contradict with the existing seniority system. This, 
however, is not a probable story. From above discussions, we do suspect 
that the openness of labor market never bring the desirable results. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We have examined the several features of the LMF. The effort induc-
ed by the new employees and their fresh knowledge plays a key role. Our 
conclusions are summarized as follows. First, the adjustment cost cannot 
determine the optimal labor growth rate definitely. Second, the effort func-
tion serves the qualitative adjustment mechanism, Third, under the special 
conditions, the LMF can determine the optimal labor input level. These 
results are able to give some implications for the Japanese economy. 
There are many directions in which we can extend our analysis. 
First, we have not fully scrutinized the shape and nature of the effort func-
tion, so our analysis depends on some intuition, then, we must find the 
micro-foundation of 0 (n) (the forthcoming paper intends on doing it). Se-
cond, we have formalized the effort effect by O'j(k z ) because production 
technology is OJ(k z ). If we treat it asj(k z , 0) like Romer (1989) then the ef-
fort effect would bej'O'. This must be more general form. Third, it is most 
interesting trial to treat O(n)as a stochastic form. Because O(n)can be seen 
a technological shock so we can find a way for the business cycle theory. 
These problems will be no doubt an important area of the future research. 
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